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NOTES
EXXON SHIPPING, THE POWER TO SUBPOENA FEDERAL
AGENCY EMPLOYEES, AND THE HOUSEKEEPING
STATUTE: CLEANING UP THE HOUSEKEEPING
PRIVILEGE FOR THE CHIMNEY-SWEEPER'S BENEFIT
Are men of the first rank and consideration, are men high in
office, men whose time is not less valuable to the public than
to themselves,-are such men to be forced to quit their busi-
ness, their functions, and what is more than all, their plea-
sure, at the beck of every idle or malicious adversary, to
dance attendance upon every petty cause? Yes, as far as it is
necessary,-they and everybody! What if, instead of parties,
they were witnesses? Upon business of other people's, every-
body is obliged to attend, and nobody complains of it. Were
the Prince of Wales, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the
Lord High Chancellor, to be passing by in the same coach
while a chimney-sweeper and a barrow-woman were in a dis-
pute about a halfpennyworth of apples, and the chimney-
sweeper or the barrow-woman were to think proper to call
upon them for their evidence, could they refuse it? No, most
certainly.'
In the United States, citizens generally have extensive rights
to access governmental information. In the arena of discovery,
the government is no more exempt, beyond certain limited
privilege claims, from the evidentiary process than is the aver-
age citizen.2 In fact, even the president may be subject to sub-
poenas for his testimony,3 an occurrence that would fulfill
1. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192 (John T.
MeNaughton rev. 1961) (quoting 4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 320-21 (John
Bowring ed., 1843)).
2. See Don Lively, Government Housekeeping Authority: Bureaucratic Privileges
Without a Bureaucratic Privilege, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 495, 505 (1981).
3. See Susan Schmidt, Presidential Court Appearance Sought, WASH. POST, Feb.
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Bentham's assertion.
The phrase "the public.., has a right to every man's evi-
dence" has echoed throughout Supreme Court opinions for de-
cades.4 Courts and legislatures have rigorously upheld this basic
principle,5 except, it seems, when discovery entails a subpoena
of governmental agencies. This Note explores the difficulties that
parties to civil litigation encounter when they attempt to sub-
poena a federal agency employee.' It will examine the policies
2, 1996, at A4. Susan McDougal asked a federal court to subpoena President Clinton
to testify in the Whitewater trial. Id.
4. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); United States v. Bryan,
339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2192); WIGMORE, supra
note 1, § 2192; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) (stating that society is similarly entitled).
5. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994) (addressing public access to federal agency
rules, opinions, orders, and records). The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) pro-
vides the public with vast rights to procure copies of government documents and
publications. FOIA does not discuss nondocumented information, such as testimony
from government employees. See id.; see also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
285 (1979) (observing that FOIA was passed as a response to fears of governmental
secrecy and abuse of power).
6. This Note does not address actions to which a government agency is a party.
As this Note explains, it is well settled and accepted that the normal rules of dis-
covery bind an agency when the government is a party to the litigation. See infra
notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
Additionally, this Note is concerned only with civil actions. The government,
acting as prosecutor, is an interested party in criminal cases, and the defendant's
rights to information increase in the criminal context. See United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953) ("[S]ince the Government which prosecutes an accused also has
the duty to see that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake
prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of
anything which might be material to his defense."); United States v. Andolschek, 142
F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944) (holding that, although it is lawful "for a department of
the government to suppress documents, even when they will help determine contro-
versies between third persons," this does not include the suppression of information
in a criminal prosecution); United States v. Feeney, 501 F. Supp. 1337, 1341 (D.
Colo. 1980) (stating that the rights of a defendant in a criminal case are greater
than those of a party in a civil suit). But cf. United States v. Bizzard, 674 F.2d
1382, 1387 (11th Cir.) (holding that a defendant in a criminal proceeding must com-
ply with the procedural requirements of agency regulations), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
973 (1982); United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398, 406 (10th Cir.) (finding that the
defendant could not claim that the court had erred in refusing to require an agency
employee to testify because the defendant had not followed the procedures under the
agency's housekeeping regulation), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977).
Furthermore, this Note examines only discovery requests related to information
obtained by employees within their scope of employment. Normal discovery principles
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and legal arguments that agencies advance to justify their refus-
al to allow discovery. In particular, this Note will concentrate on
the use of the so-called "housekeeping privilege," examining the
validity of this "privilege" and how judicial decisions have affect-
ed it.
Private parties to civil litigation frequently request the testi-
mony of federal agency employees7 because agency employees,
while fulfilling their job duties, obtain information critical to the
cases of private litigants.8 Without access to this information,
litigants lose important evidence. The courts consistently have
found that fact finders must examine all the available evidence
to determine the truth Under the present system of regula-
tions, however, private litigants face a difficult task when they
seek the testimony of an agency employee. This Note explores
the problems that litigants encounter when they attempt to gain
access to governmental information in the form of testimony.
This Note weighs the pros and cons of the current procedures;
argues that a recent Ninth Circuit case, Exxon Shipping Co. v.
United States Department of the Interior,0 is moving in the
right direction by rejecting the restrictive majority interpretation
of the housekeeping privilege; and proposes a legislative remedy.
govern information acquired outside a federal employee's scope of employment. See
Robert R. Kiesel, Note, Every Man's Evidence and Ivory Tower Agencies: How May a
Civil Litigant Obtain Testimony from an Employee of a Nonparty Federal Agency?,
59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1647, 1648-49 n.5 (1991).
Lastly, this Note is concerned only with attempts to depose or receive the testi-
mony of federal agency employees. Although there is some overlap, discovery of
textual information usually is undertaken under FOIA because the statute requires
prompt agency response and speedy judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)-(ii);
Lively, supra note 2, at 497 n.13.
7. See, e.g., Davis Enters. v. EPA, 877 F.2d 1181, 1188 (3d Cir. 1989) (referring
to statistics showing that the Environmental Protection Agency "received seventy-one
requests or subpoenas for testimony in private litigation" within two years of adopt-
ing a housekeeping regulation), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990); Moore v. Armour
Pharmaceutical Co., 129 F.R.D. 551, 554 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (stating that the Center for
Disease Control receives an "overwhelming" number of inquiries), affd, 927 F.2d
1194 (11th Cir. 1991).
8. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774,
776 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that the appellants asserted that the requested testimo-
ny was "central to the underlying litigation").
9. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
10. 34 F.3d 774.
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Exxon Shipping helped to clarify the muddied waters of the
housekeeping privilege by setting forth a standard for courts to
use in evaluating agency denials of testimony."
This Note first examines the statutory and case-law basis for
the housekeeping privilege. The first section will discuss the
history of the Federal Housekeeping Statute 2 and the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute's authority.
The second section will explain how the housekeeping privilege
has developed and how modern courts have interpreted, or mis-
interpreted, the privilege. The Note will then concentrate on the
Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Exxon Shipping and how this
case affects current agency practices. Finally, this Note will
discuss the policy justifications that federal agencies have as-
serted and will weigh them against litigants' rights to full dis-
covery and access to governmental information. This section of
the Note will also compare the different standards of review that
courts have applied in housekeeping cases and will determine
the appropriateness of the Exxon Shipping test. Finally, this
section will examine the continuing problems that litigants face
and will propose legislative action to alleviate them.
THE BASIS FOR THE HOUSEKEEPING PRIVILEGE
The Statutory History of the Housekeeping Act
In 1789, during the presidency of George Washington, Con-
gress "enacted [a bill] to help General Washington get his ad-
ministration underway by spelling out the authority for exec-
utive officials to set up offices and file Government docu-
ments."'3 The statute was first codified in 1875 as section 161
11. See infra text accompanying notes 163-82; see also Recent Case, Civil Proce-
dure-Subpoena Power-Ninth Circuit Rejects Authority of Non-Party Federal Agen-
cies To Prevent Employees from Testifying Pursuant to a Federal Subpoena-Exxon
Shipping Co., v. United States Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 1994), 108
HARv. L. REv. 965, 967 (1995) ("The Ninth Circuit's holding in Exxon Shipping rep-
resents a welcome reassertion of the federal courts' ability to control their proceed-
ings through their power to compel the production of documents and the testimony
of witnesses.").
12. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
13. H.R. REP. No. 1461, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3352, 3352; see also Lively, supra note 2, at 498 n.15 (noting that
1140
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of the Revised Statutes, and government agencies used it to
deny access to information as early as 1877.4
In its original form, the Housekeeping Statute stated that
"[t]he head of each department is authorized to prescribe regula-
tions, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his de-
partment, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution
and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and pres-
ervation of the records, papers, and property appertaining to
it." 5 Agency officials interpreted the language of this statute as
a grant of complete authority over public access to agency infor-
mation.'" Agency regulations spelling out guidelines for answer-
ing discovery requests for documents and testimony, commonly
called housekeeping regulations, soon appeared.'7
The Touhy Doctrine
Litigants eventually challenged agencies' usurpation of au-
thority in court. In 1900, in Boske v. Comingore, 8 the United
States Supreme Court determined the validity of the housekeep-
ing regulation of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)." A state
trial court in Kentucky had held an IRS collector in contempt for
refusing to provide certain documents during his deposition."
The Supreme Court heard the case2' after the collector chal-
lenged the contempt order in federal court on the ground that
producing the documents was illegal under an IRS regulation.22
several 1789 statutes authorized executive department heads to have custody and
control of all office documents).
14. See H.R. REP. No. 1461, supra note 13, reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.CA.N. at
3352. The statute also was used "as a basis for a sort of official information privi-
lege." 26A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5682 (1992); cf Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 309 (1979)
(stating that the statutory antecedents of the Housekeeping Statute were consolidat-
ed in 1874).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1952).
16. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
17. For a list of current agency housekeeping regulations, see infra note 40.
18. 177 U.S. 459 (1900).
19. See id. at 467.
20. See id. at 464. The original action was brought by Kentucky against Elias
Block & Sons to determine the amount of whiskey produced but not listed for state
and county taxes. Id. at 461-62.
21. See id. at 465.
22. Id. at 465-67. The regulations stated that "[c]ollectors are hereby prohibited
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The Court held that the regulation was valid under the House-
keeping Statute, stating that the Secretary of the Treasury,
under the regulations as to the custody, use and preservation
of the records, papers and property appertaining to the busi-
ness of his Department, may take from a subordinate, such
as a collector, all discretion as to permitting the records in
his custody to be used for any other purpose than the collec-
tion of the revenue, and reserve for his own determination all
matters of that character.3
Consequently, the State could not hold the collector in contempt
for complying with a legal regulation.24
The Court came to virtually the same conclusion over fifty
years later in United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen.25 In Touhy,
a prisoner in an Illinois state penitentiary brought a claim
against the warden in federal district court.26 The prisoner
sought to subpoena a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
agent, who he claimed had evidence that would exculpate
him. The agent, whom the court held in contempt for refusing
to submit to the discovery request, claimed that he was exempt
under the Department of Justice housekeeping regulations. 8
The Supreme Court followed its ruling in Boske and held that
the regulation was valid under the Housekeeping Statute.29
from giving out any special tax records or any copies thereof to private persons or
to local officers, or to produce such records or copies thereof in a state court, wheth-
er in answer to subpoenas duces tecum or otherwise." Id. at 460-61.
23. Id. at 470. The Court also held that a regulation adopted under the
Housekeeping Statute is valid unless it is "plainly and palpably inconsistent with
law." Id.
24. See id. at 467.
25. 340 U.S. 462 (1951).
26. Id. at 463.
27. See id. at 464-65.
28. See id. at 463. The regulation, 11 Fed. Reg. 4920 (1946), stated that an "offi-
cer or employee on whom such subpoena is served, unless otherwise expressly direct-
ed by the Attorney General, will appear in court in answer thereto and respectfully
decline to produce the records specified there in [sic], on the ground that the disclo-
sure of such records is prohibited by this regulation," Touhy, 340 U.S. at 463-64 n.1.
29. See Touhy, 340 U.S. at 469-70. Boske and Touhy are slightly distinguishable
because of the origins of their underlying actions. Boske's subpoena was issued by a
state court, whose contempt ruling the IRS employee appealed to the federal courts.
See Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 464-65 (1900). In contrast, Touhy originated
as a federal suit. See Touhy, 340 U.S. at 463. This distinction did not play a role in
1142
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The Court stated that centralization of the determination wheth-
er to challenge a subpoena is essential because of the variety of
agency information and "the possibilities of harm from unre-
stricted disclosure."" The Court, however, limited its ruling to
discovery requests against a subordinate agency employee by ex-
pressly refusing to determine an agency head's authority to
disobey a discovery request."' Commentators refer to the pro-
tection afforded agency subordinates that stems from this ruling
as the "Touhy doctrine."32
The 1958 Amendment
Despite the explicit limits of the Touhy ruling, the Housekeep-
ing Statute was adapted by executive officials over the years as
"a convenient blanket to hide anything Congress may have ne-
glected or refused to include under specific secrecy laws."3 In
the Court's ruling in either case but has become an important distinction in subse-
quent cases. See infra notes 49-154 and accompanying text.
30. Touhy, 340 U.S. at 468.
31. Id. at 467 ("We find it unnecessary . . .to consider the ultimate reach of the
authority of the Attorney General to refuse to produce at a court's order the gov-
ernment papers in his possession . . . ."); id. at 469 ('The constitutionality of the
Attorney General's exercise of a determinative power as to whether or on what
conditions or subject to what disadvantages to the Government he may refuse to
produce government papers under his charge must await a factual situation that re-
quires a ruling.").
Justice Frankfurter again stressed this point in his concurrence. While agreeing
that a subordinate agency employee could not be held in contempt, Justice Frank-
furter believed that the agency head must be held accountable. See id. at 472
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter stated quite fervently:
To hold now that the Attorney General is empowered to forbid his subor-
dinates, though within a court's jurisdiction, to produce documents and to
hold later that the Attorney General himself cannot in any event be
procedurally reached would be to apply a fox-hunting theory of justice
that ought to make Bentham's skeleton rattle.
Id. at 473 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). He apparently was referring to Bentham's
statement quoted at the beginning of this Note. See Kiesel, supra note 6, at 1653
n.26.
32. See Kiesel, supra note 6, at 1652.
33. H.R. REP. No. 1461, supra note 13, reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3353;
see also 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 14, § 5682 (maintaining that use pf
housekeeping regulations "quickly became a common practice of government attor-
neys"); Gregory S. Coleman, Note, Touhy and the Housekeeping Privilege: Dead But
Not Buried?, 70 TEx. L. REV. 685, 687 (1992) ("The decision in Touhy is often cited
for the proposition that an agency head is free to withhold evidence from a court
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1958, Congress passed a one-sentence amendment to the statute
in an attempt to clarify its authority.34 The amendment read:
"This section does not authorize withholding information from
the public or limiting the availability of records to the public."35
The revision to the Housekeeping Statute was passed without a
dissenting vote in either the House of Representatives or the
Senate.36 It was the first statute devoted solely to freedom of
information 7 and was part of a concerted effort to increase ac-
cess to governmental records and combat government secrecy.38
Although the language of the amendment was direct in its de-
mand for openness, the addition had little, if any, effect on fed-
eral agency responses to discovery requests.3 9
without a specific claim of privilege.").
34. See H.R. REP. No. 1461, supra note 13, reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3353 (stating that the purpose of the bill was to correct the situation in which "ex-
ecutive officials have let every file clerk become a censor"); see also Coleman, supra
note 33, at 688 (stating that Congress answered the public outcry against Touhy by
passing the amendment).
35. H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972). The current version of the
Housekeeping Statute is located at 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
36. 1 BURT A. BRAVERMAN & FRANCES J. CHETWYND, INFORMATION LAW § 1-2.2
(1985).
37. H.R. REP. NO. 1419, supra note 35, at 2.
38. See 1 BRAVERMAN & CHETWYND, supra note 36, § 1-2.1. Other measures at
the time included the passage of FOIA and the revisions to section 3 of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act. See id. § 1-2.
39. See H.R. REP. NO. 1419, supra note 35, at 2 (indicating that "some agencies
are still relying on the original 1789 'housekeeping' statute as authority to withhold
certain types of information from the public," despite the passage of the amendment
fourteen years before the report); 1 BRAVERMAN & CHETWYND, supra note 36, § 1-2.2
(contending that a 1959 survey of agency procedures showed that "the amendment
was completely ineffective").
Many commentators at the time of the amendments passage and for many
subsequent years believed that it would increase public access to agency information.
See Milton M. Carrow, Governmental Nondisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U.
PA. L. REV. 166, 197 (1958) ("[T]he Federal 'Housekeeping' Act has been amended to
preclude its use as a basis for regulations dealing with the nondisclosure of informa-
tion by subordinate officials . . . ."); G. Larry Engel, Introduction: Information Disclo-
sure Policies and Practices of Federal Administrative Agencies, 68 NW. U. L. REV.
184, 187 (1973) (stating that misuse of the Housekeeping Statute ended with the
1958 amendment); John J. Mitchell, Government Secrecy in Theory and Practice:
"Rules and Regulations" As an Autonomous Screen, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 207-08
(1958); Note, Discovery from the United States in Suits Between Private Liti-
gants-The 1958 Amendment of the Federal Housekeeping Statute, 69 YALE L.J. 452,
452 (1960) ("Litigants in suits to which the United States is not a party may seek
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Federal Agency Regulations
As authorized by the Housekeeping Statute, most federal
agencies have passed regulations limiting access to agency re-
cords and testimony from agency employees concerning agency
business.40 These regulations commonly give the heads of agen-
aid from the 1958 amendment of the federal 'housekeeping' statute in their attempts
to obtain government-held information which, while not privileged, may not be di-
vulged by subordinate officials under department regulations.") (footnotes omitted);
Mark S. Wallace, Note, Discovery of Government Documents and the Official Informa-
tion Privilege, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 148 (1976) ("The demise of the housekeeping
statute as a reliable roadblock to discovery of official information accelerated in 1958
when the statute was amended."); see also Coleman, supra note 33, at 689 ("Most, if
not all, commentators agree that the amendment was intended to abrogate the de
facto privilege that had arisen under various housekeeping regulations."). But see
T.D. Taubeneck & John J. Sexton, Executive Privilege and the Court's Right To
Know-Discovery Against the United States in Civil Actions in Federal District
Courts, 48 GEO. L.J. 486, 494 n.36 (1960) ("It is now the position of the administra-
tion that the amendment is a virtual nullity.").
40. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. §§ 1631.30-.33 (1995) (Federal Retirement Thrift Investment
Board); id. §§ 2502.30-.33 (Executive Office of the President); 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.210-.219
(1995) (Office of the Secretary of Agriculture); 10 C.F.R. §§ 9.200-.204 (1995) (Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission); id. §§ 202.21-.26 (Department of Energy); 12 C.F.R. §
261.14 (1995) (Federal Reserve System); 13 C.F.R. § 102.8 (1995) (Small Business
Administration); 15 C.F.R. §§ 15a.1-.7 (1995) (Office of the Secretary of Commerce);
id. §§ 275.1-.5 (National Institute of Standards and Technology); id. §§ 909.1-.5 (Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration); 16 C.F.R. § 4.11(e) (1995) (Federal
Trade Commission); 17 C.F.R. § 200.735-3(b)(7) (1995) (Commodities Futures Trading
Commission); id. § 230.122 (Securities and Exchange Commission); 18 C.F.R. §
388.111 (1995) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.1-2 (1995)
(Food and Drug Administration); 22 C.F.R. §§ 206.1-.6 (1995) (Agency for Interna-
tional Development); 24 C.F.R. §§ 2004.1-.7 (1995) (Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development); 27 C.F.R. § 71.27 (1995) (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire-
arms); 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.21-.29 (1995) (Department of Justice); 29 C.F.R. §§ 2.20-.25
(1995) (Office of the Secretary of Labor); id. §§ 1610.30-.36 (Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission); 32 C.F.R. §§ 97.1-.6 (1995) (Office of the Secretary of De-
fense); id. §§ 516.33-.49 (Department of the Army); id. §§ 1905.1-.4 (Central Intelli-
gence Agency); 33 C.F.R. § 1.20 (1994) (United States Coast Guard); 37 C.F.R. §§
15a.1-.7 (1995) (Patent and Trademark Office, Department of Commerce); 40 C.F.R.
§§ 2.401-.406 (1995) (Environmental Protection Agency); 44 C.F.R. §§ 5.80-.89 (1994)
(Federal Emergency Management Agency); 45 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-.6 (1995) (Department of
Health and Human Services); 47 C.F.R. § 0.463 (1994) (Federal Communications
Commission); 49 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-.19 (1995) (Office of the Secretary of Transportation);
id. §§ 835.1-.9 (1994) (National Transportation Safety Board).
Although the housekeeping regulations confer broad authority to agency heads,
their provisions do not have the "force and effect of law." In Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), the Supreme Court held that § 301 authorizes only
"'rules of agency organization procedure or practice' as opposed to 'substantive
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cies the power to refuse requests for the testimony of agency em-
ployees.4' If the agency head refuses to comply or does not re-
spond to a request for testimony, the regulations often require
the subpoenaed employee to appear before the court and respect-
fully refuse to answer any questions.42 This practice has led
many state courts to mistakenly hold the subordinate agency
employee in contempt, despite the relatively clear command of
the Touhy doctrine.43
The standards created by the regulations to guide agency
determinations of when to comply with a discovery request are
extremely varied and ill-defined. Some regulations allow an
agency head to heed a subpoena request only when the testimo-
ny would "clearly be in the interests" of the agency," when
"necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice,"45 or even simply
when it is "not . . . contrary to the public interest."" Often,
housekeeping regulations provide no standard of determination
at all, giving the agency head free rein.' This lack of direct,
rules,'" id. at 310. The Court stated earlier in the opinion that "[iin order for a reg-
ulation to have the 'force and effect of law,' it must have certain substantive charac-
teristics." Id. at 301. But see Ex Porte Sackett, 74 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 1935)
(holding that the Department of Justice regulation had "the force and effect of law");
Marcoux v. Mid-States Livestock, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 573, 579 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (stating
that housekeeping "regulations have the force and effect of law, thereby preventing
th[e] Court from punishing a subordinate official for conforming to that law").
41. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 2.404(a) (1995) ("The General Counsel or his
designee . . . determines whether compliance with the subpoena would clearly be in
the interests of [the] EPA and responds as soon as practicable."); Kiesel, supra note
6, at 1648-49.
42. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 2.404(b) (1995).
If the General Counsel or his designee denies approval to comply with
the subpoena, or if he has not acted by the return date, the employee
must appear at the stated time and place . . . , produce a copy of these
regulations and respectfully refuse to provide any testimony or produce
any documents.
Id. The regulation cites Touhy for support. Id.
43. See infra notes 60-85 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 2.404(a) (1995).
45. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 9.1(c)(1) (1995).
46. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.122 (1995); see also 15 C.F.R. § 909.5(c) (1995) (stat-
ing that an employee may testify if it would be "in the public interest" to provide
the information).
47. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. §§ 1631.30-.33 (1995); id. §§ 2502.30-.33; 10 C.F.R. §§ 9.200-
.204 (1995); id. §§ 202.21-.26; 13 C.F.R. § 102.8 (1995); 21 C.F.R. § 20.1 (1995); 29
C.F.R. §§ 2.20-.25 (1995); id. §§ 1610.30-.36; 44 C.F.R. §§ 5.80-.89 (1994); 47 C.F.R. §
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unambiguous language allows agency heads great leeway in
their decisions whether to allow a subordinate agency employee
to testify. Such power is dangerous because it gives agency
heads unfettered discretion to affect the outcome of private civil
actions. Under current procedure, once an agency head makes a
determination not to allow a litigant to obtain the testimony of
an employee, the litigant often is without any viable recourse.
As a result, courts must create and apply some clear oversight
standard.48
MODERN JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE
HOUSEKEEPING PRIVILEGE
Since the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Touhy,
courts consistently have applied the Touhy doctrine to shield
agency subordinates from the discovery process and contempt
proceedings.49 Housekeeping cases, however, also have arisen
0.463 (1994).
At least five housekeeping regulations, however, do provide stricter standards
with which agency heads must comply. See 22 C.F.R. § 206.6 (1995); 27 C.F.R. §
71.27 (1995); 28 C.F.R. § 16.26 (1995); 32 C.F.R. § 97.6(b) (1995); id. § 1905.4(c);
Kiesel, supra note 6, at 1656-57. For example, the Department of Justice regulation,
28 C.F.R. § 16.26 (1995), states:
(a) In deciding whether to make disclosures pursuant to a demand,
Department officials and attorneys should consider:
(1) Whether such disclosure is appropriate under the rules of proce-
dure governing the case . . . , and
(2) Whether disclosure is appropriate under the relevant substantive
law concerning privilege.
(b) Among the demands in response to which disclosure will not be
made . . . are those . . . to which any of the following factors exist:
(1) Disclosure would violate a statute, . . .
(2) Disclosure would violate a specific regulation;
(3) Disclosure would reveal classified information, unless appropri-
ately declassified, ...
(4) Disclosure would reveal a confidential source or informant,
(5) Disclosure would reveal investigatory records compiled for law
enforcement purposes,...
(6) Disclosure would improperly reveal trade secrets without the
owner's consent.
Id.
48. See infra notes 213-44 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 104-05. Although Touhy technically involved the discovery of
documents, courts have repeatedly and consistently held that the reasoning in Touhy
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in a myriad of other forms. The most important distinction is be-
tween actions that originate in state court and actions brought
in federal court. Such a distinction is important because a liti-
gant's ability to challenge an unfavorable discovery ruling by an
agency largely depends on the forum.
Additionally, the composition of the parties plays a significant
role in affecting a court's capacity to force agency subordinates
to testify. Private litigants' rights vary depending on whether
the United States is a party to the action.
This section examines the courts' treatment of the Housekeep-
ing Statute in three different substantive and procedural set-
tings: (1) suits involving the United States as a party, (2) suits
originally brought in state court, and (3) suits originally brought
in federal court.
Suits Involving the United States As a Party
The Housekeeping Statute has played a relatively minor role
in providing agencies with an excuse to withhold employee testi-
mony when the United States is a party to the litigation. In a
civil action 0 in which the government is an interested party,
agencies theoretically must abide by the same discovery rules as
other litigants.5
The Supreme Court adopted this reasoning in United States v.
Reynolds.52 In Reynolds, the widows of civilians killed in an Air
Force plane crash sued the government and moved for the pro-
applies equally to subpoenas for testimony. See Boeh v. Gates, 25 F.3d 761, 766 (9th
Cir. 1994) (listing cases in which courts have applied the Touhy doctrine to requests
for agency employee testimony), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
50. See supra note 6 (discussing criminal cases in which the government loses the
privilege to withhold testimony stemming from its role as prosecutor).
51. See Mosseller v. United States, 158 F.2d 380, 382 (2d Cir. 1946) ("Having con-
sented to the suit, the United States should be held to have placed itself in the po-
sition of an ordinary litigant before the court, to whom the rules of civil procedure
ordinarily apply."); Lively, supra note 2, at 505 ("Supposedly, government is not ex-
cepted from the normal discovery and evidentiary processes, beyond the point of a
valid privilege claim."); Coleman, supra note 33, at 689 n.23; Kiesel, supra note 6,
at 1675 n.136 ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to agencies when they
are parties to civil litigation."); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) (specifying nonparty
organizations).
52. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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duction of the official accident investigation report and state-
ments from the surviving crew members." The government
argued that the housekeeping privilege "against revealing mili-
tary secrets" excused production.'
The Court refused to rule whether "the executive department
heads have power to withhold any documents in their custody
from judicial view if they deem it to be in the public interest,"55
thereby leaving open the ultimate question of the existence of a
housekeeping privilege. Instead, the Court examined the merits
of the motion under the language of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 34.56 The Court held that the head of the department with
control over the matter must lodge a formal claim of privilege,
and the court "must determine whether the circumstances are
appropriate for the claim of privilege."57 This holding suggests
that the government is subject to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and is required to claim a privilege in order to with-
hold agency information. 8
53. Id. at 3. The motion was made under Rule 34. See infra note 56 for the text
of Rule 34.
54. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6.
55. Id.
56. That version of Rule 34 provided:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice
to all other parties, and subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b), the court
in which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of
the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts,
letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters within the
scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b) and which are in his
possession, custody, or control; or (2) order any party to permit entry
upon designated land or other property in his possession or control for
the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the
property or any designated object or operation thereon within the scope
of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b). The order shall specify the
time, place, and manner of making the inspection and taking the copies
and photographs and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are
just.
Id. at 3 n.3 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 8.
58. See also United States v. Winner, 641 F.2d 825, 832-33 (10th Cir. 1981) (hold-
ing that the Deputy Attorney General must advance a claim of privilege, reviewable
by the court); Harvey Aluminum (Inc.) v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 749, 755 (9th Cir. 1964)
(requiring the National Labor Relations Board to claim a privilege under its house-
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The Supreme Court also seemed to propound that courts may
review an agency head's determination that a valid privilege
exists. The Court stated that "]udicial control over the evidence
in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive offi-
cers."59 Reynolds, therefore, and lower court opinions interpret-
ing it, appear to require federal agencies to abide by normal
discovery rules when an agency is a party to the suit.
Actions Brought in State Courts
Courts have given broader rights to federal agencies when the
United States is not a party in the underlying litigation. Many
parties seeking the testimony of a federal agency employee bring
keeping regulation in order to withhold information).
In Winner, the government brought a mandamus proceeding against the federal
district court to force the court to vacate its discovery ruling. Winner, 641 F.2d at
827. The judge in the district court was the Honorable Fred M. Winner. Id. at 825.
It is somewhat ironic that Judge Winner's discovery ruling was appealed because he
has researched and written extensively on the Housekeeping Statute and the regula-
tions based thereon. In 1960, Judge Winner delivered a speech to the Tenth Circuit
Judicial Council entitled "Procedural Methods To Attain Discovery." Fred M. Winner,
Procedural Methods To Attain Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 97 (1961); see also EEOC v. Los
Alamos Constructors, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1373, 1375 (D.N.M. 1974) (Winner, J.)
(claiming judicial and congressional support for his views). After reviewing the Su-
preme Court's decisions in Boske, Touhy, and Reynolds, Judge Winner concluded that
a "claim of privilege must be supported by a showing of more than bureaucratic
whimsy." Winner, supra, at 109.
In Los Alamos Constructors, the EEOC filed a claim, before Judge Winner,
against a construction company for discriminatory employment practices. Los Alamos
Constructors, 382 F. Supp. at 1374. Judge Winner examined in depth the case histo-
ry of discovery from governmental agencies that are a party to an action, comment-
ing that "[wihen the government or one of its agencies comes into court (with very
few exceptions), it is to be treated in exactly the same way as any other litigant."
Id. at 1375 (brackets replaced with parentheses).
More recently, Judge Winner authored the opinion in United States v. Feeney,
501 F. Supp. 1337 (D. Colo. 1980). Feeney was a criminal case in which the defen-
dant subpoenaed government officials. Id. at 1339. Judge Winner reiterated his earli-
er positions from the civil context and stated that "the rights of a defendant in a
criminal case to full public presentation of the facts are even greater than are the
rights of a party in a civil suit." Id. at 1341. Judge Winner again held that the
government must assert a privilege to withhold testimony and that the agency head
"must appear to explain and justify his insistence on secrecy," id. at 1347, and that
the court had the power to determine the validity of a privilege claim, id.
59. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10. Courts that have examined the Reynolds opinion
have reached that same conclusion. See, e.g., Winner, 641 F.2d at 832-33.
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their cases in state courts under state law. If an agency head
decides not to allow a subordinate to testify, private litigants in
state court have many procedural hurdles to jump before they
can adequately challenge the agency head's determination. Pro-
cedural demands force most state cases with housekeeping prob-
lems into federal court,60 either through removal or through a
collateral federal suit.
Actions Removed to Federal Court
Frequently, during state court trials, a litigant seeks to sub-
poena a federal agency employee for a deposition or testimony.
Problems occur when the agency head directs a subpoenaed
subordinate not to accede to the subpoena under the authority of
the agency's housekeeping regulation. Despite the apparently
straightforward application of the Touhy doctrine in such cases,
state judges often hold the subordinate in contempt for refusing
to comply with a court order. Such an unfortunate agency em-
ployee invariably will remove the case to federal district court
under Title 28, § 1442 of the United States Code.6 Private
litigants trying to enforce a state court's discovery order in
federal removal cases face two obstacles: (1) the Touhy doctrine
and (2) sovereign immunity. Federal courts limit private
parties' ability to obtain needed agency testimony by relying on
60. In a few cases, state courts have invoked the Touhy doctrine to deny discov-
ery. See, e.g., State v. Tascarella, 580 So. 2d 154, 157 (Fla. 1991) (holding that the
trial court could not compel Federal Drug -Enforcement Administration agents to tes-
tify but imposing sanctions on the state, by excluding evidence, in retaliation for
noncompliance); State v. Rice, 335 N.W.2d 269, 276-77 (Neb. 1983) (sustaining a mo-
tion to quash discovery subpoenas under the Touhy doctrine).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1988). The pertinent portion of the provision states:
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court
against any of the following persons may be removed by them to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing
the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or per-
son acting under him, for any act under color of such office or on ac-
count of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress
for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of
revenue.
Id. A contempt order qualifies under the section as an action against the agency
official. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
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these legal impediments.
Federal Courts Invoking the Touhy Doctrine
Smith v. C.R.C. Builders Co.62 is an example of a case in
which a federal court overruled a state court contempt order
under the Touhy doctrine. After removal to district court, the
agency employee, a supervisor at the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), sought to quash the state court's
contempt order." The party seeking discovery argued that
Touhy was "outdated and no longer the law in light of a post-
Touhy amendment" to the Housekeeping Statute.' The court
simply rejected this reading of the amendment, quashed the
contempt order, and suggested that, to seek relief, the party
should subpoena the agency head."
A similar incident occurred in Swett v. Schenk,66 in which a
California state court held an investigator for the National
Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB) in contempt for re-
fusing to answer certain questions. 7 After deciding that re-
moval was proper under § 1442,68 the Ninth Circuit stated
that "the Touhy doctrine [was] jurisdictional and preclude[d] a
contempt action regardless of whether [the agency's housekeep-
ing regulation was] ultimately determined to protect the re-
quested testimony."69
Sovereign Immunity
In addition to the Touhy doctrine, litigants in a removal pro-
ceeding may face the imposing hurdle of sovereign immunity, an
obstacle created by the United States' system of federalism.
Several federal courts have determined that, absent any waiver,
federal employees are immune from discovery orders from state
62. 626 F. Supp. 12 (D. Colo. 1983).
63. Id. at 13.
64. Id. at 14.
65. Id. at 15.
66. 792 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986).
67. Id. at 1449.
68. Id. at 1451.
69. Id. at 1452.
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courts under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.70 This doc-
trine applies to suits in state court as well as to suits that defi-
ant agency employees remove to federal court.7
In Reynolds Metals Co. v. Crowther,72 a federal district
court decided that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred it
from compelling federal officials to testify.73 The case involved
a private civil action in state court. The subpoenaed Depart-
ment of Labor employees removed the contempt proceeding,
concerning their failure to comply with the litigant's discovery
request, to federal court.74 Basing its decision on Supreme
Court precedent, 5 the court stated that "[iut is ... well-estab-
lished that an action seeking specific relief against a federal of-
ficial, acting within the scope of his delegated authority, is an
action against the United States, subject to the governmental
privilege of immunity from suit."76 The court feared that "sig-
nificant loss of manpower hours would predictably result" if
state courts routinely could force agency employees to testify in
private litigation.77
The District Court for the District of Columbia followed
Reynolds by invoking sovereign immunity in Environmental
Enterprises v. EPA8 and Sharon Lease Oil Co. v. Federal En-
70. See infra notes 72-85 and accompanying text. But see Coleman, supra note 33,
at 697-700. Coleman argues that the application of sovereign immunity in the house-
keeping context is inappropriate and ill-founded. Id. at 697-98. Coleman also con-
tends that courts' application of sovereign immunity is unjustifiably unequal and
that sovereign immunity should apply to suits arising in federal court as well as to
suits in state courts. Id. at 699.
71. The jurisdictional bounds of the state court also limit the jurisdiction of feder-
al courts that receive cases on removal. See Boron Oil Co. v. Downie, 873 F.2d 67,
70 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Coleman, supra note 33, at 696 ("ITihe federal courts
will declare that they, too, may be incompetent to determine the merits of the gov-
ernment's claim because the case was initiated in state court."); infra note 85 and
accompanying text.
72. 572 F. Supp. 288 (D. Mass. 1982).
73. Id. at 291.
74. Id. at 289.
75. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 702-03
(1949) (holding that an action against a federal official was an action against the
sovereign).
76. Reynolds Metal, 572 F. Supp. at 290 (citing Larson, 337 U.S. at 692).
77. Id.
78. 664 F. Supp. 585 (D.D.C. 1987).
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ergy Regulatory Commission.79 In Environmental Enterprises,
the court quashed several discovery subpoenas and stated that
"[a]s to sovereign immunity, there is obvious merit to the argu-
ment that federal officers should not be subpoenaed to testify in
state courts [sic] proceedings of which they are not parties
without their approval.""0 In Sharon Lease, the court similarly
concluded that "the subpoena at issue must be quashed because
the state court had no jurisdiction to compel a nonparty federal
official to testify or produce documents absent a waiver of sover-
eign immunity."
81
In Boron Oil Co. v. Downie,82 the Fourth Circuit similarly
held that a state court, and thus a federal district court on re-
moval, did not have jurisdiction over a federal agency employee
when the government was not a party to the state court ac-
tion."3 The court found that a state court's assertion of author-
ity to override an agency's housekeeping regulations violated the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause.' The court further explained
that "[w]here the state court lacks jurisdiction of the subject
matter or of the parties, the federal court [on removal] acquires
none, although in a like suit originally brought in a federal court
it would have had jurisdiction."5
79. 691 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1988).
80. Environmental Enters., 664 F. Supp. at 586.
81. Sharon Lease, 691 F. Supp. at 385. While relying on sovereign immunity as
the basis for its ruling, the court balanced the litigants' need for the testimony
against the public interest in protecting government resources. Id. at 384. This sug-
gests that the court might not apply sovereign immunity as a bar if the proponent
of discovery could "demonstrate compelling need" for the evidence that "outweigh[s]
the public interest involved." Id.
82. 873 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1989).
83. Id. at 68. The court relied heavily on the language of Reynolds (perhaps too
heavily at times-the court used two direct quotes without citing Reynolds). Compare
id. at 69 with Reynolds Metals Co. v. Crawther, 572 F. Supp. 288, 290 (D. Mass.
1982).
84. Downie, 873 F.2d at 71. The court also stated that federal agencies have a
compelling interest in keeping their employees "free to conduct their official business
without the distractions of testifying in private civil actions in which the government
has no genuine interest." Id. This statement ignores the government's competing in-
terest in ensuring justice in the judicial process through comprehensive fact-finding.
85. Id. at 70 (quoting Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 389 (1939)). Most
recently, a federal district court in Indiana has addressed these same issues in
Bosaw v. National Treasury Employees' Union, 887 F. Supp. 1199 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
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Separate Collateral Federal Suits
State court proponents of discovery have attempted to bring
separate collateral actions in federal court as a method of avoid-
ing the Touhy doctrine and sovereign immunity. In such a pro-
ceeding, the litigant typically names the agency or the agency
head as a defendant. By directly filing a legitimate separate
complaint against the agency, a federal court attains original
jurisdiction. Several courts have advised litigants to pursue this
approach,"6 but parties seeking discovery from agency officials
rarely have undertaken such a step. 7
Despite court assurances that a separate federal suit is the
correct procedural path, litigants have, at times, been led astray.
A litigant unsuccessfully attempted to follow this path in Giza v.
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfdre.8" In Giza, the
plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court seeking an order to
compel the Food and Drug Administration to allow certain em-
ployees to testify.8" The plaintiffs alleged that the court had
jurisdiction: (1) under the Freedom of Information Act,"0 (2)
under 28 U.S.C. § 1361,"' and (3) as a matter of comity." The
The court in Bosaw held that sovereign immunity and the Supremacy Clause barred
the state court from ordering a federal officer to produce documents and that, there-
fore, the federal court, with derivative jurisdiction, could not render a decision on a
motion to compel production of IRS records. Id. at 1217.
86. See, e.g., Swett v. Schenk, 792 F.2d 1447, 1452 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (advising
that the proper method for challenging the refusal to testify would be a direct action
against the agency pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702); Smith v. C.R.C. Builders Co., 626
F. Supp. 12, 15 (D. Colo. 1983) (stating that the discovery proponent should sub-'
poena the agency head); infra text accompanying note 116.
87. A limited number of litigants have filed collateral federal suits due to the ex-
tremely high costs associated with filing a separate action. Filing a new complaint
also takes a significant amount of time. Such an action often would be moot by the
time it was decided because of the progression and completion of the underlying
state court action. See infra notes 245-49 and accompanying text.
88. 628 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1980).
89. Id. at 749.
90. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988) (granting the district courts original jurisdiction over
mandamus actions against federal officers).
92. Giza, 628 F.2d at 750. Comity is the principal that "courts of one . . . juris-
diction will give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another . . . jurisdiction, not
as a matter of obligation but out of deference and mutual respect." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990).
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First Circuit upheld the district court's finding that it did not
have jurisdiction to enforce a state court subpoena; however, the
court refused to decide whether a federal court could compel the
testimony of a federal official despite or against the agency
head's instruction. 3
Parties have run into other deadends while following this
path. In Davis Enterprises v. EPA,94 the litigants were success-
ful in getting the court to review the agency's denial of discov-
ery, but the agency withstood the challenge. From underlying
civil litigation in Pennsylvania state court, Davis Enterprises
filed an action against the EPA for refusing to allow the deposi-
tion of an agency employee.95 The Third Circuit adjudged that
the decision was reviewable 96 but held that the court was "only
free to determine whether the agency followed its own guidelines
or committed a clear error of judgment."7 The court went on to
conclude that the EPA's decision was not arbitrary, capricious,
or an abuse of discretion based upon the EPA's interests in con-
serving its resources and avoiding the appearance of favoring
one party over another. 9'
While federal courts have been reluctant to overrule agency
decisions, even when directly challenged, a recent federal court
of appeals case may crack open the door to discovery for private
93. Giza, 628 F.2d at 751-52.
94. 877 F.2d 1181 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).
95. Id. at 1182. Davis Enterprises apparently brought suit under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA), alleging that the EPA's decision was "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." See 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A) (1994).
96. The EPA had argued and the district court had found that, under 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a), the court could not review the EPA's decision. Davis Enters., 877 F.2d at
1184. Section 701(a) of the APA creates an exception to the reviewability of agency
decisions when "statutes preclude judicial review" or when the "agency action is com-
mitted to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). The EPA contended that the
Housekeeping Statute (in this case, 5 U.S.C. § 301) and the Touhy doctrine provided
"unfettered discretion on matters pertaining to control of its employees." Davis En-
ters., 877 F.2d at 1185. The Third Circuit rejected this position. Id. at 1186.
97. Davis Enters., 877 F.2d at 1186.
98. Id. at 1186-87. The court stressed that it disagreed with the EPA determina-
tion that its interests outweighed those of the public "in having public employees
cooperate in the truth seeking process by providing testimony useful in litigation,"
id. at 1188, but the court could not substitute its judgment for that of the EPA, id.
at 1186.
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litigants by setting a stricter standard of review. The next sec-
tion of this Note will discuss suits originally brought in federal
court and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v.
United States Department of the Interior99 in detail.
Actions Brought in Federal Courts
Federal Law Causes of Action 0
Litigants have had less difficulty attaining judicial review of
an agency's determination not to allow an employee to testify
when litigants have brought the underlying action in federal
court. The Supreme Court's decisions in Boske and Touhy bind
federal courts, as they do state courts and federal courts with
limited jurisdiction, °' but many of the state court difficulties
are not present in federal court. Sovereign immunity does not
hamper federal courts,"2 and litigants do not have to worry
that the government will remove the discovery issue to a new
forum.' 1
0 3
99. 34 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 1994).
100. This section concerns cases arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) ("The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
101. One of the first instances in which a federal court followed the Supreme
Court's lead in housekeeping analysis was Ex Parte Sackett, 74 F.2d 922 (9th Cir.
1935). Citing Boske, the Ninth Circuit overturned a district court's contempt ruling
against a subordinate Department of Justice (DOJ) employee. Id. at 923-24. The
court stated that the DOJ regulation had "the force of law" and that the lower court
"had no jurisdiction or power to punish an officer for conforming to that law." Id. at
923. The court refused to address "[wihether or not the Attorney General could be
compelled to produce such records in response to a subpoena or to testify concerning
them." Id. at 924.
A few years after Touhy, the Sixth Circuit exonerated an employee of the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from a district court's contempt order in In
re SEC, 226 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955). The court ruled that the SEC employee was
protected by Touhy for acting in accordance with the SEC's rules. Id. at 517.
102. See, e.g., Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 398 n.2
(D.C. Cir. 1984). The court in Northrop discussed "whether sovereign immunity
might bar an action to enforce a subpoena directed against the government
when . . . the government is not itself a party to the litigation." Id. The court found
that, since 1965, sovereign immunity has not applied to such a subpoena and that
the government must assert a privilege to prevent discovery. Id.
103. The federal courts are still subject to agencies' separation of powers argu-
ments. See infra text accompanying notes 206-09.
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Litigants in federal courts, however, have a remaining hurdle.
While federal courts have jurisdiction over local agency employ-
ees, the courts' jurisdiction may not extend to the agency head.
In these situations, most federal courts refuse to force a subordi-
nate agency employee to testify against the explicit orders of an
agency head.0 4 Courts so refusing contend that the Touhy doc-
trine removes any authority that a court may have had to com-
pel a local official to testify."5 As a result, litigants are strand-
ed in federal actions in much the same way that they are in
state actions. A separate action against the agency head is often
a private litigant's only means of obtaining relief and compelling
discovery.
For example, in Saunders v. Great Western Sugar Co.,"0 6
Great Western subpoenaed several local officials of the Small
Business Administration (SBA) during a federal antitrust
suit.'°7 The court felt that requiring litigants to bring an action
against the agency head in the District of Columbia was a hard-
ship and saw "no reason why the claim of governmental privi-
lege may not be determined as satisfactorily in a federal court
removed from the District of Columbia as in a court that is there
located."' 5 Nevertheless, neither 28 U.S.C. § 136119 nor 28
U.S.C. § 1391(e)"0 granted the court jurisdiction over agency
heads in this type of case; therefore, the court was bound by the
104. See, e.g., Boeh v. Gates, 25 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
898 (1995); Saunders v. Great W. Sugar Co., 396 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1968);
Hubbard v. Southern Ry., 179 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Ga. 1959) (refusing to enforce
subpoena against a subordinate official in an action under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act).
105. See infra note 109-11; see also Marcoux v. Mid-States Livestock, Inc., 66
F.R.D. 573, 580 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (holding that the court was "without power to
compel [an agency head], who is not a party to this action, to produce requested
materials which are in his custody and are located outside the jurisdictional bound-
aries of this Court").
106. 396 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
107. Id. at 794-95.
108. Id. at 795.
109. Section 1361 provides that "It]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the
United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28
U.S.C. § 1361 (1994).
110. Section 1391(e) governs venue in "civil action[s] in which a defendant is an of-
ficer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).
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Touhy doctrine."'
The Ninth Circuit faced a similar situation in Boeh v.
Gates.'12 In Boeh, the plaintiff in a civil rights action in federal
district court subpoenaed an FBI agent to testify."' An official
at the Department of Justice directed the agent not to obey the
subpoena under the department's housekeeping statute, and the
district court subsequently held him in contempt." The Ninth
Circuit held that the FBI agent could not be held in contempt
for complying with a valid regulation under the Touhy doc-
trine."5 The court stated that the proper method of attempting
to compel the agent's testimony would be to bring the de-
partment head into court and contest his or her decision not to
permit the subordinate's testimony."6 The court suggested that
litigants could accomplish this either by filing a separate action
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)117 or possibly by
bringing a mandamus action against the department head to
force the grant of permission to testify."' The court stated that
"[olnce properly before the appropriate court, the [department
head] or designated official could have claimed whatever privi-
leges might shield [the agency employee's] testimony and the
court could then have ruled on those assertions of privilege."1 9
Other courts have taken a different route to sidestep the
Touhy doctrine and gain jurisdiction over agency heads. Several
federal courts have found authority to review agency head deci-
sions when the agency head directs the subordinate not to testi-
111. Saunders, 396 F.2d at 795. A similar situation arose in Cates v. LTV Aero-
space Corp., 480 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1973). The Fifth Circuit concluded that a sub-
poena of local agency officials under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) could
not "be used to obtain documents in custody of the head of a non-party government
agency in Washington, D.C." Id. at 621.
112. 25 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
113. Id. at 763. Neither the FBI agent nor the United States was a party to the
action. Id.
114. Id. For a portion of the text of the Department of Justice housekeeping regu-
lation, 28 C.F.R. § 16.26 (1995), see supra note 47.
115. Boeh, 25 F.3d at 763-64.
116. Id. at 764.
117. Id. at 764 n.3 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1984)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 764 (citing Committee for Nuclear Responsibility Inc. v. Seaborg, 463
F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1961)).
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fy under a claim of privilege.2 ' This claim of privilege,
whether expressly made or implicitly found in the agency head's
direction to the subordinate, forms the foundation for jurisdic-
tion over the agency head.'2 '
For example, in NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 2 Capitol subpoe-
naed an attorney of the NLRB in an unfair labor practice hear-
ing against it. 2' The NLRB refused to allow the subordinate
employee to testify, and the trial examiner revoked the subpoe-
na,124 which Capitol subsequently appealed.' 2 ' Although
Capitol did not directly subpoena or bring an action against the
NLRB, the court held:
[Wihen a party has filed a request for evidence or testimony
and the request can be properly denied only if the evidence
or testimony is privileged, the question of privilege is as
squarely raised by an unexplained refusal to comply as by
an express claim of privilege, and the court must decide the
question."'
The court held that the judiciary must test the validity of any
privilege claim'2 and stated that to require direct service of
the agency was a waste of time and resources. 2'
In McFadden v. AVOC Corp.,'29 the defendant requested tes-
timony from certain Army personnel, and the Army, although
not a party to the action, ordered the person not to produce the
statements."' The government, seeking to quash the discovery
order, contended that, under Touhy, "the defendant must direct
120. See, e.g., Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d at 875.
121. See, e.g., McFadden v. AVCO Corp., 278 F. Supp. 57, 59 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
122. 294 F.2d 868.
123. Id. at 870.
124. Id. at 870-71.
125. See id. at 868.
126. Id. at 875.
127. Id.
128. The court emphasized that "to require service of process on the N.L.R.B.
would open the possibility that some litigants would be deprived of the use of mate-
rial, unprivileged evidence; it would impose an additional and unnecessary burden on
parties seeking to obtain government records; it would lay a trap for the unwary."
Id.
129. 278 F. Supp. 57 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
130. Id. at 57-58.
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the subpoena to the Secretary of the Army personally."131 The
district court held that it could decide whether the Army had a
valid reason for withholding the testimony because the Secretary
of the Army had determined to assert a privilege.132 The court
believed that centralization, the purpose of the Housekeeping
Statute, had been fulfilled; therefore, judicial oversight was
proper.33 After finding that the Army did not have a valid rea-
son for denying the testimony,' the court went on to proclaim
that "[t]he courts and the litigants are entitled to accurate infor-
mation in their search for truth,... and there would seem little
reason for denying them access to it, when, as here, the chance
of interfering with the Army's future investigations is
slight."1
35
A district court in Rosee v. Board of Trade31 confronted a
similar scenario in which the Secretary of Agriculture had di-
rected a subordinate department employee not to produce re-
quested documents. 13 Although the proponent of discovery did
not bring an action against the Secretary of Agriculture, and al-
though the Secretary did not lodge a claim of privilege, the court
nonetheless examined the substantive merits of an implicitly
alleged governmental privilege. 3 ' The court held that the gov-
ernment had "squarely raised" a claim of privilege by instructing
the subordinate to refuse the discovery request.139 The court
found justification for such a position by distinguishing between
agency determinations that certain material cannot be produced
and agency determinations that the wrong employee was asked
to comply with discovery." In this case, the court held that,
131. Id. at 58.
132. See id. at 59.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 59-60.
135. Id. at 60.
136. 35 F.R.D. 512 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
137. Id. at 514.
138. Id. at 513-14.
139. Id. at 514.
140. The court stated:
The refusal of a subordinate to produce documents may be grounded on
a determination by the department head going directly to "what docu-
ments can be produced" rather than to the narrow issue of who should
be asked to produce. Were the determination only to the latter issue,
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because the Secretary had determined that the agency would
produce some documents but not others, an implicit claim of
privilege had arisen.' The court went on to overrule the Sec-
retary's determination, stating that "[w]ithout statutory au-
thority, an executive officer may not erect a privilege which will
bar judicial scrutiny."''
A fourth federal court made a similar ruling in Denny v.
Carey.' Denny involved a class action claim in which the
plaintiff moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a) to
compel discovery from the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.' The plaintiff failed to follow the guidelines
of the Board's housekeeping regulations, but the court found
that the Board had "waived any right to assert... non-compli-
ance as a ground for not disclosing the report."" 5 The court al-
so concluded that there was no jurisdictional bar to the court's
consideration of the Board's privilege claim, 4 6 stating that it
was "the 'formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the
department which has control over the matter, after actual per-
sonal consideration by that officer,' which confer[red] upon [the
court] jurisdiction to rule on that claim."" 7
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction Actions
4 1
In diversity actions, federal district courts have original juris-
diction. "9 Although the action is based on state law, the feder-
Touhy would seem to control, but where it is clear that the department
head has already made the substantive determination ...no purpose is




142. Id. at 515.
143. 78 F.R.D. 370 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
144. Id. at 371.
145. Id. at 372.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 373 (internal citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953)).
148. This section concerns actions arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994) (granting
original jurisdiction in "civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds .
$50,000" and diversity of citizenship exists between the parties).
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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al courts are not limited in their authority to subpoena federal
employees to the same extent as are state courts.' 5 The feder-
al district courts have the same jurisdiction, and litigants the
same discovery obstacles, whether the case is a federal action or
a diversity action.
For example, in Tholem Supply Co. v. Continental Casualty
Co., '5 a federal district court quashed subpoenas for the testi-
mony of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) em-
ployees in an insurance contract dispute.'52 The court held that
the litigants' only recourse was "to procure service of the subpoe-
na duces tecum upon the appropriate official, in this case the
Director of the BATF."'5 '
EXXON SHIPPING Co. V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR15
Exxon Shipping arose as a result of the disastrous Exxon
Valdez oil spill in Alaska in March 1989.' Exxon, in an un-
derlying state damage action against it, sought discovery from
employees of five federal administrative agencies who Exxon
claimed had obtained information central to the litigation.55
The government did not reply to the discovery requests or move
to quash them, but instructed eight employees not to submit to
a deposition, and instructed two others not to answer certain
questions.'57
Exxon brought suit in federal court alleging that the Federal
150. See Moore v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1194 (11th Cir. 1991). In
Moore, the Eleventh Circuit did not question the district court's command over feder-
al employees but, rather, upheld the lower court decision to quash the discovery
request under the "arbitrary [and] capricious" standard of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A) (1994). Moore, 927 F.2d at 1197.
151. 859 F. Supp. 467 (D. Kan. 1994).
152. Id. at 468.
153. Id. at 470.
154. 34 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 1994).
155. In 1989, fishermen, landowners, businesses, and local governments sued Ex-
xon for compensatory and punitive damages. See id. at 775 (citing the underlying
litigation).
156. Id. at 775-76. The information "included the extent of damage to Alaska's
natural resources." Id. at 776.
157. Id. at 775.
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Housekeeping Statute did not authorize the government's refus-
al15 and that the agencies' actions were illegal under the
APA.'59 The agencies countered that agency regulations, pro-
mulgated under the authority of the Housekeeping Statute,
allowed the agency heads to prohibit their subordinate employ-
ees from obeying discovery requests when the government was
not a party to the litigation.6 ' They relied heavily on Touhy
and its progeny.6 '
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Touhy by clarifying that, in
this action, the agencies, while not parties in the underlying
action, were now named as defendants in a collateral suit.162
The court thus squarely took on the issue purposely left open by
Touhy: what authority do federal agencies have to withhold
information from the discovery process? 63 The court analyzed
the text and legislative history of the Housekeeping Statute and
found that the statute did not authorize agency heads to with-
hold testimony and documents from federal courts."M Rather,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the statute did not grant any
authority in itself but was simply an administrative device to
centralize control over agency information.'65 The court inter-
preted Touhy and Chrysler Corp. v. Brown'66 to support its
holding that § 301 "did not provide 'substantive rules' regulating
disclosure of government information."67 The court, therefore,
effectively rejected the argument that any independent house-
158. See 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
159. See id. §§ 702-706. Exxon also claimed before the federal district court in
Alaska that "the government's refusal to provide the requested discovery violated the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the U.S. Constitution because the United
States was a de facto party to the action." Exxon Shipping, 34 F.3d at 776. Exxon
did not appeal the district court's rejection of this claim. Id.
160. Exxon Shipping, 34 F.3d at 776. The district court agreed with the
government's argument. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated correctly that, "[wihen the gov-
ernment is named as a party to an action, it is placed in the same position as a
private litigant, and the rules of discovery in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
apply." Id. at 776 n.4; see supra text accompanying notes 50-59.
161. Exxon Shipping, 34 F.3d at 776.
162. Id. at 777.
163. Id.; see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
164. Exxon Shipping, 34 F.3d at 777-78.
165. Id. at 777.
166. 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
167. Exxon Shipping, 34 F.3d at 777 (quoting Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 310).
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keeping privilege exists.
Additionally, the government maintained that agencies have
the right to determine whether to comply with a discovery re-
quest under the principles of sovereign immunity.6 The gov-
ernment cited Downie to support its argument.'69 The Ninth
Circuit refused to apply the Fourth Circuit's decision in Downie;
instead, the court limited Downie to its specific facts and reject-
ed any extension of its holding.7 ' The court appropriately
found that Downie's use of sovereign immunity was restricted to
state court subpoenas and contempt actions or discovery re-
quests from federal courts with limited removal jurisdiction. 7'
The court noted that sovereign immunity, which stems from the
Supremacy Clause, does not apply when a federal court validly
exercises its discovery powers over federal officials.'72 The
court strengthened its position by citing cases that held that
judicial control over evidence cannot be inferior to the authority
of executive branch officials. 73
In the last section of its opinion, the Ninth Circuit dealt with
the government's claim of hardship as a justification for authori-
ty to deny discovery requests. 74 The court recognized that the
government has a "serious and legitimate concern that its em-
ployee resources not be commandeered into service by private
litigants to the detriment of the smooth functioning of govern-
ment operations."75 Nevertheless, the court held that these
concerns must be addressed under the general rules of discov-
168. Id. at 778.
169. Id. (citing Boron Oil Co. v. Downie, 873 F.2d 67, 69 (4th Cir. 1989)); see supra
notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
170. Exxon Shipping, 34 F.3d at 778 & n.8.
171. Id. at 778.
172. Id.; see Leyh v. Modicon, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Ind. 1995). The district
court in Leyh directly confronted "whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity per-
mits the head of a federal agency to refuse conclusively to permit an agency employ-
ee to testify in response to a command of a federal court." Id. at 422. The court
agreed with the Ninth Circuit that agencies could not use sovereign immunity to re-
fuse to comply. Id. at 423.
173. Exxon Shipping, 34 F.3d at 778-79. In a footnote, the court noted that the
government had waived any potential claims to immunity under the APA's right of
review. Id. at 779 n.9.
174. Id. at 779-80.
175. Id. at 779.
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ery.'76 The court explained that the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and any potential claims of privilege adequately protect-
ed the government agencies' interests."7 The Ninth Circuit re-
manded the case to the district court to consider the
government's denial of discovery under these standards.'78
Exxon Shipping broadened the public's discovery rights by
putting to rest any government contention that the Housekeep-
ing Statute sanctions agency denial of discovery in its own right.
Under the court's holding, when a litigant directly challenges an
agency's decision by filing suit under the Housekeeping Statute,
the district court should apply the standard given by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.7 ' The court did not reach Exxon's
claim that the agencies' actions were arbitrary and capricious
under § 706(2)(A) of the APA but reserved the right to review
the government's decision under the APA."80 The court further
"acknowledge[d] that collateral APA proceedings can be costly,
time-consuming, inconvenient to litigants, and may 'effectively
eviscerateD' any right to the requested testimony."'' The
court, however, failed to explain the difference between the bur-
dens of filing an APA challenge and the burdens of filing a col-
lateral Housekeeping Statute challenge." 2 The real benefit of
Exxon Shipping stems from the stricter standard of judicial
review rather than any savings of litigants' time or money.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 779-80. "[W]e believe that federal district courts, in reviewing subpoena
requests under the federal rules of discovery, can adequately protect both an
individual's right to 'every man's evidence' as well as the government's interest in
not being used as a 'speakers' bureau for private litigants.'" Id. at 780. For a discus-
sion of the discovery rules under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see infra
notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
178. Exxon Shipping, 34 F.3d at 780.
179. Id. at 779-80.
180. Id. at 780.
181. Id. at 780 n.11 (alteration in original) (quoting Boeh v. Gates, 25 F.3d 761,
770 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (Norris, J. dissenting), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995)).
182. Considering the Ninth Circuit's decision in Boeh, it seems unlikely that the
court meant to instill the district courts with the jurisdiction to review agency deci-
sions without an independent direct action against the agency. See supra notes 112-
19 and accompanying text.
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DISCUSSION OF THE ALTERNATIVE STANDARDS
AVAILABLE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
CONTINUING PROBLEMS UNDER AGENCY HOUSEKEEPING
In the rare cases in which a party brings a procedurally prop-
er challenge, the courts are split over the appropriate standard
of judicial review of an agency heads decision. Courts constantly
balance litigants' interests against those of agencies and have
had difficulty establishing a just and workable standard of judi-
cial review. The Ninth Circuit's holding that "district courts
should apply the federal rules of discovery when deciding on
discovery requests made against government agencies, whether
or not the United States is a party to the underlying action,"'
is the boldest step that courts have taken to open access to agen-
cy employee testimony. Despite the optimistic expectations that
this holding creates, many serious problems remain for lawmak-
ers to solve.
Weighing the Policy Justifications Advanced by Agencies Against
the Public's Right to Every Man's Evidence
To better understand the pros and cons of increasing discovery
access to agency employees, one must weigh agencies' interests
in prohibiting disclosure against private parties' rights to full
discovery. These competing interests should form the backdrop
to any judicial decision whether to compel discovery.
Federal Agency Interests
Federal agencies and executive officials repeatedly have de-
fended the notion of a housekeeping privilege. Agencies assert a
myriad of justifications for their denials of testimony, including
the conservation of scarce government resources, the retention of
agency impartiality, the protection of privileged information, and
the preservation of separation of powers." 4
183. Exxon Shipping, 34 F.3d at 780.
184. Agency housekeeping regulations often announce a list of policy reasons to jus-
tify their procedures. A common example is the regulation of the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST), which states:
To carry out its statutory mission effectively, NIST must apply the
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Conservation of Agency Resources
The most common governmental concern is the conservation of
agency resources. Agencies fear that repeated discovery requests
would disrupt their administrative duties. For example, in
Moore v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co.,' the court recognized
that requiring doctors from the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services to testify would interfere with that agency's "in-
terest in maximizing the use of its limited resources in dealing
with a national health crisis."8 6
Other courts have additionally recognized and stressed the
need to examine the cumulative effect on an agency's resources
rather than the burden of an individual request. In Davis Enter-
prises v. EPA,"7 the court found that the EPA had a genuine
interest in avoiding a drain of resources and that the EPA's
"concern about the effects of proliferation of testimony by its
employees is within the penumbra of reasonable judgmental
decisions it may make.""s Likewise, in Reynolds Metals Co. v.
Crowther,1"9 the court feared that "[ilf OSHA employees were
routinely permitted to testify in private civil suits, significant
loss of manpower hours would predictably result."
90
Commentators and litigants have attacked the cogency of the
expertise of the many scientific and technical experts it employs exclu-
sively to the performance of its official duties, including providing scien-
tific and technical advisory services to other Federal agencies. It is es-
sential that NIST also maintain a policy of strict impartiality among
private litigants, and that it ensure that its employees adhere to the
responsibilities for which they were employed. To these ends, it is the
policy of NIST that its employees shall not testify nor otherwise appear
in legal proceedings not involving the United States or its officers or
employees in their official capacity as a named party in order to produce
data, information, or records which concern matters related to official
duties of NIST employees or the functions of NIST.
15 C.F.R. § 275.1(c) (1995).
185. 927 F.2d 1194 (11th Cir. 1991).
186. Id. at 1197-98.
187. 877 F.2d 1181 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).
188. Id. at 1187; see also Alex v. Jasper Wyman & Son, 115 F.R.D. 156, 158-59 (D.
Me. 1986) (ordering a less burdensome discovery method because of "the important
public policy favoring the conservation of government resources and the protection of
orderly governmental operations").
189. 572 F. Supp. 288 (D. Mass. 1982).
190. Id. at 290.
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government's interest in protecting its resources on many
grounds. Under most agency housekeeping regulations, the sub-
poenaed employee must seek permission to testify from the
agency head and, if denied, must appear before the court and
cite the Touhy doctrine and the governing regulation. 9' Such
employees commonly, although unjustifiably, have faced con-
tempt orders.'92 Additionally, litigants may take direct action
against the agency head.' Defending against such a discovery
request can be extremely time- and resource-consuming in its
own right. The expense of defending the agency decision "[u]nder
current practice, ... in some instances, may even be more costly
to the agency in the long run than allowing the employee to
testify when originally requested."94
Furthermore, a discovery request is not any more burdensome
to a federal agency than is a request to a private business seek-
ing the testimony of its employees.' In fact, agency regula-
tions do not even make allowances for offers of compensation
from persons requesting discovery.'96 Finally, the use of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure standard adequately takes
account of any burden on the agency.' 97
Retaining Agency Impartiality
Agencies also contend that providing testimony favorable to a
particular side in litigation creates the impression that the agen-
cy is partial.' 8 They reason that, as a representative of the
government and the public as a whole, it is not within the agen-
cy's role to favor a particular party in private litigation. The
Third Circuit in Davis Enterprises v. EPA99 recognized this
191. Kiesel, supra note 6, at 1670-71.
192. See supra notes 60-85 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
194. Kiesel, supra note 6, at 1670-71.
195. See id. at 1671 n.119.
196. Id.
197. See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text.
198. See Moore v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 129 F.R.D. 551, 553 (N.D. Ga. 1990)
(citing "the government's policy of remaining strictly neutral in private litigation" as
a reason for refusing to allow depositions), affd, 927 F.2d 1194 (1991).
199. 877 F.2d 1181 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).
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interest. The court held that, "[alithough it [was] certainly argu-
able that permitting [the agency subordinate] to give a deposi-
tion based on facts within his knowledge would not create the
appearance of taking sides, the EPA's conclusion to the contrary
[was] not capricious.""2 '
Impartiality is a tenuous justification for withholding needed
discovery. Commentators and judges have found that the idea
that the public would view the act of providing evidence request-
ed by a particular party as favoritism is "illusory."'' As stated
by the dissenting judge in Davis Enterprises, "[t]o withhold testi-
mony that may be helpful to one side is to favor the other, but
more importantly for society, is to prejudice proper resolution of
the litigation.""'
Protecting Privileged Information
Agencies further argue that the Housekeeping Statute be-
stows upon them the power to withhold evidence to protect privi-
leged information. While the government has a valid compelling
interest in protecting privileged information,"'3 the housekeep-
ing regulations and agency withholdings under them "allow re-
fusal of a much larger class of testimony than would be permit-
ted if an agency had to rely solely upon privileges."" 4 The
overinclusiveness of these regulations demonstrates that courts
must test denials of evidence under a fair and more narrowly
tailored standard that prohibits discovery of privileged informa-
tion, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 5
200. Id. at 1186-87.
201. Kiesel, supra note 6, at 1673.
202. Davis Enters., 877 F.2d at 1191 (Weis, J., dissenting); see also Kiesel, supra
note 6, at 1673 ("[TIhe nondisclosure of germane evidence by a federal agency tips
the scales of justice unfairly in favor of a private litigant-the one whose case the
evidence would harm.").
203. See Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1450 (1985); see also Lively, supra note 2, at 507-10 (discussing the deliberative
privilege).
204. Kiesel, supra note 6, at 1673.
205. See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text; see also Lively, supra note 2,
at 507 (suggesting that government employees' housekeeping interests should receive
the same protection that any witness receives from annoyance, embarrassment, op-
pression, undue burden, or expense under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)).
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Preserving Separation of Powers
An undeveloped but potentially troublesome agency justifica-
tion lies in the doctrine of separation of powers." 6
It has been argued that the statute gave the executive
branch control of public records, that the Congress has de-
veloped similar regulations for responding to judicial subpoe-
nas of its records, and that the Housekeeping Act is simply a
Congressional acquiescence in the right of the executive
branch to do the same, that is, the privilege is justified, like
the executive privilege, by the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers.2"
Although federal agencies have not proffered separation of pow-
ers in defense of the housekeeping privilege, the United States
Supreme Court has provided a basis for this argument. In Unit-
ed States v. Reynolds,"' the Court stated in dictum that "[ilt is
said that [the precursor to the modern Housekeeping Statute] is
only a legislative recognition of an inherent executive power
which is protected in the constitutional system of separation of
power."2 °9
Private Litigants' Rights to Discovery
To understand the effect of federal agencies' current house-
keeping policies, one must weigh agency justifications for control
over employee testimony against private litigants' rights to that
testimony. As stated at the beginning of this Note, the United
206. See Boeh v. Gates, 25 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898
(1995). Contrary to the argument advanced by the agencies, the private litigant in
Boeh argued that the housekeeping regulation violated "the separation of powers by
vesting an executive branch official with the heretofore exclusively judicial power to
determine what evidence will be admitted in a civil trial." Id. at 764. The court re-
jected this approach. Id.
207. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 14, § 5682 (footnotes omitted); see also Kiesel,
supra note 6, at 1659-60 n.58 (discussing separation of powers problems).
208. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
209. Id. at 6 n.9. A full analysis of the application of separation of powers to the
Housekeeping Statute is beyond the scope of this Note. For an explanation of sepa-
ration of powers as it applies to government agencies, see Peter L. Strauss, The
Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
COLtmJ. L. REv. 573 (1984).
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States Supreme Court repeatedly has found that "[t]he pub-
lic.., has a right to every man's evidence."21 0 Testimony from
governmental employees is a pure form of "public evidence." For
federal agencies to limit access to this information without effi-
cacious judicial review and under situations not covered by any
viable privilege inhibits a fundamental right of the citizenry.21" '
The use of governmental testimony in judicial proceedings is
essential to the fair and complete administration of justice. The
Supreme Court has noted that "[mlodern instruments of discov-
ery serve a useful purpose.... They, together with pretrial
procedures, make a trial less a game of blindman's buff and
more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to
the fullest practicable extent. Only strong public policies weigh
against disclosure."212 Admittedly, this public interest is less
quantifiable than agency costs, but to underestimate the impor-
tance that a full hearing of the relevent evidence plays in trials
would cripple the legal system and its underlying mission to
uncover the truth and ensure fairness. To put into place obsta-
cles that effectively prevent litigants from getting agency em-
ployee testimony, as the current housekeeping rules do, im-
pacts the public's interest at least as much as do agency costs,
and it places government employees in unwarranted, protected
positions.
Standards Available for Judicial Review
Courts are far from a consensus regarding the proper stan-
dard to use when examining an agency's housekeeping decision.
The three most prominent standards are: (1) a balancing of in-
210. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); United States v. Bryan,
339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
211. Congress and the courts repeatedly have permitted public access to govern-
mental information and have construed limits on access narrowly. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1994); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) ("Whatever their ori-
gins, these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly creat-
ed nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.").
212. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (citations
omitted); see also Lively, supra note 2, at 506 ("To accept housekeeping rationales as
the foundation of a privilege would represent a substantial departure from the pre-
cept that all rational means for ascertaining truth should be drawn upon unless a
transcending public interest would be jeopardized.").
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terests test, (2) the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of the
APA, and (3) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure standard.
Balancing of Interests Test2 13
At least one court has relied on a strict balancing of compet-
ing interests when reviewing an agency's claim of privilege.214
In Denny v. Carey,215 the court adopted a "balancing approach,"
stating that, "when the privilege is claimed, it is necessary to
balance interests to determine whether disclosure would be more
injurious to the consultative function of government than non-
disclosure would be to the private litigant's defense."216 Such a
balancing test would undoubtedly take into account many of the
factors laid out previously in this section.
The 'Arbitrary and Capricious" Standard
Too often, courts have turned to the lenient standard of the
APA. Under 5 U.S.C. § 702, "[a] person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action... is entitled to judicial review there-
of."2 7 The judicial standard for reviewing agency actions is
whether such actions were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 8
Several courts have applied the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard when reviewing agency housekeeping decisions. In
Davis Enterprises, the court tested the EPA's decision under the
213. One commentator termed this test the "government privilege standard." See
Coleman, supra note 33, at 713.
214. In Florida v. Cohen, 887 F.2d 1451 (11th Cir. 1989), the court was concerned
"whether the district court struck the correct balance when it concluded that, under
the circumstances of this case, the government's need to protect investigative records
pertaining to an ongoing criminal investigation outweighed [the defendant's] need for
the information requested," id. at 1454. The court held that the district court had
struck the correct balance. Id. at 1455. Because the underlying action was criminal
in nature, it is unclear whether the court would apply this standard when reviewing
a discovery request in a civil action.
215. 78 F.R.D. 370 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
216. Id. at 373-74 (quoting United States v. Article of Drug Consisting of 30 Indi-
vidually Cartoned Jars, More or Less, 43 F.R.D. 181, 190 (D. Del. 1967)).
217. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994). For an example of how a circuit court treated an ex-
ception to the right of judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 701, see supra note 96.
218. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
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APA standard and stated that it was "only free to determine
whether the agency followed its own guidelines or committed a
clear error of judgment."219 The court concluded that the EPA
had not abused its discretion.22
In Moore v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co.,22' the Eleventh Cir-
cuit recognized that, normally, the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure "strongly favor full discovery whenever possible"222 but
ruled that the lower court could only overturn the agency's deci-
sion if it was arbitrary or capricious.2  In Wade v. Singer
Co.,2" a district court stated that it was bound to adhere "to a
governmental agency's decision not to allow its employees to
give testimony at least where the party seeking the testimony
fails to make a strong showing that the testimony is neces-
sary." 225 The court in Wade found that the agency "did not act
arbitrarily."
26
The problem with this approach is that, under such a stan-
dard, the courts only examine whether the agency made a ratio-
nal decision. The courts do not assess the validity or merits of
the agency heads' claims of privilege.22 ' As one commentator
has noted, "such a standard assumes that the Housekeeping Act
and the regulations established under its authority grant gov-
ernment agencies a privilege... which is subject only to a 'se-
verely limited' scope of review."228 Such limited judicial review
strongly disfavors private litigants. Because courts are extremely
reluctant to find that an agency abused its discretion,229 pri-
219. Davis Enters. v. EPA, 877 F.2d 1181, 1186 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1070 (1990).
220. Id. at 1188.
221. 927 F.2d 1194 (11th Cir. 1991).
222. Id. at 1197.
223. Id.
224. 130 F.R.D. 89 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
225. Id. at 92.
226. Id.
227. See Coleman, supra note 33, at 711 (arguing that reviewing agency decisions
on their merits better preserves judicial function than reviewing for reasonable good
faith on the agency's part).
228. Id.
229. But see United States Steel Corp. v. Mattingly, 89 F.R.D. 301 (D. Colo.), reu'd,
663 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1980). In Mattingly, the district court held the housekeeping
regulation of the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) invalid under the "arbitrary
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vate parties with real needs for agency information are realisti-
cally without recourse.
The Exxon Shipping Standard: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set out the guidelines for
discovery in federal civil cases. Under Rule 30(b)(6), civil liti-
gants have the ability to subpoena a federal agency.23 Rule
and capricious" test. Id. at 305. The district court examined the Housekeeping Stat-
ute and found that "it [was] unlikely that Congress would have empowered NBS to
obstruct access to information, or suppress evidence needed by the courts, without
expressing such an intent in a specific provision." Id. at 304. The district court did
not even mention Boske or Touhy in its analysis but balanced the interests in dis-
closure against NBS's reasons for denial and concluded that "[iln the interest of jus-
tice these regulations cannot be allowed to preclude the discovery sought by [the pri-
vate litigant]." Id at 305. This case, however, was an aberration, and its holding
clearly ignores solid Supreme Court precedent upholding housekeeping regulations.
See supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text. Citing Touhy, the Tenth Circuit over-
ruled the decision in a four-sentence order. United States Steel Corp. v. Mattingly,
663 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1980). This is not to say, however, that a court will not
someday find that an agency head's decision under a housekeeping regulation was
arbitrary.
230. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). The text of the Rule states:
A party may in the party's notice and in a subpoena name as the
deponent a public or private corporation or a partnership or association
or governmental agency and describe with reasonable particularity the
matters on which examination is requested. In that event, the organiza-
tion so named shall designate one or more officers, directors, or manag-
ing agents, or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf, and
may set forth, for each person designated, the matters on which the
person will testify. A subpoena shall advise a non-party organization of
its duty to make such a designation. The persons so designated shall
testify as to matters known or reasonably available to the organization.
This subdivision (b)(6) does not preclude taking a deposition by any other
procedure authorized in these rules.
Id.
The ability to subpoena a federal agency head located outside the jurisdiction of
the court is questionable. In Cates v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 480 F.2d 620 (5th Cir.
1973), the court concluded that Rule 30(b)(6) could not be used "to obtain documents
in custody of the head of a non-party government agency in Washington, D.C. by
service of a subpoena duces tecum upon a local representative of the agency," id. at
621. The consequences of this ruling are very troublesome. Under the Cates holding,
a federal court outside Washington, D.C., is unable to compel an agency head to
testify, and such a court is therefore unable to review the agency's decision. It is
not clear, however, whether this restriction would apply to collateral federal suits di-
rectly against the agency, and courts seem to be split over this issue. See Exxon
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26(c), however, provides limits and protections for parties from
whom discovery is sought. 13' Rule 26(c) allows courts to protect
a person from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense."232 Additionally, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure protect privileged material.
Shipping Co. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
that the Housekeeping Statute does not shield federal employees from valid discov-
ery requests).
231. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). The text of the Rule states:
Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from
whom discovery is sought, accompanied by a certification that the movant
has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected
parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action, and for
good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alterna-
tively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where
the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice requires
to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following
(1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had;
(2) that the disclosure or discovery may be had only on specified
terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery
other than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of
the disclosure or discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons
designated by the court;
(6) that a deposition, after being sealed, be opened only by order of
the court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a designat-
ed way; and
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or infor-
mation enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the
court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part,
the court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that
any party or other person provide or permit discovery. The provisions of




233. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5). Rule 26(b)(5) allows a party to claim that information
is privileged, but "the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the
nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a
manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable
other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection." Id.
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Several courts have applied the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure standard to requests for agency testimony. In Alex v. Jas-
per Wyman & Son,234 a district court quashed a discovery sub-
poena, but not before examining the motion to quash under Rule
26(c).235 The court acknowledged that "the courts have 'estab-
lished a trend.., away from merely ratifying' government
claims of privilege, and have engaged in balancing 'agency poli-
cies against disclosure with the legitimate demands of proper
judicial administration."'2 " The court found, however, that the
agency had provided discovery through "an alternate and less
burdensome method." s
More recently, in Leyh v. Modicon, Inc.,23 a federal district
court used the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to review a sub-
poena of an EEOC employee. The court held that "the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure give the federal courts ample power and
flexibility to prevent or restrict discovery that is obtainable from
some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or
less expensive, or where the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit." 9 After analyzing the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure factors, the court concluded
"that a protective order should be granted" to prevent injuries to
the EEOC. 40 This ruling demonstrates that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure still adequately protect agencies from inappro-
priate subpoenas.24
In Exxon Shipping,242 a federal court again held that the
proper standard of judicial review was given by the Federal
234. 115 F.R.D. 156 (D. Me. 1986); see Kiesel, supra note 6, at 1673-82 (discussing
the court's decision in Jasper Wyman and proposing a two-step approach to judicial
review).
235. Jasper Wyman, 115 F.R.D. at 158-59.
236. Id. at 158 (quoting Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp.
708 (E.D. Pa. 1968)) (omission in original).
237. Id. at 159.
238. 881 F. Supp. 420 (1995).
239. Id. at 424.
240. Id.
241. The court warned that such discovery requests "should not become a routine
method to find a short-cut to evidence or to being given pre-packaged cases" and
should be reserved for "exceptional circumstances." Id. at 425.
242. 34 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Rules of Civil Procedure.243 The court stated that, "[u]nder the
balancing test authorized by the rules, courts can ensure that
the unique interests of the government are adequately consid-
ered."2 44 By using the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stan-
dard, courts recognize that the Housekeeping Statute does not
confer a substantive privilege and ensure private litigants that
an independent, disinterested judicial body will give agency deci-
sions more than just a cursory glance. Under such review, when
available, the courts can protect the public's right to every man's
evidence.
Continuing Problems for Private Litigants and a Proposed
Legislative Solution
Although courts may and should adopt the equitable stan-
dards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to review federal
agency housekeeping decisions, many obstacles to discovery
remain entrenched in the procedural framework of jurisdictional
limits. Very few cases reach the procedural level required to
obtain judicial review. As the housekeeping doctrine now stands,
Touhy still requires litigants to bring a separate collateral action
in. federal court directly against the agency." Such a burden,
in all practicality, destroys the housekeeping discovery rights of
most litigants.246 One commentator has stated these difficulties
succinctly:
243. See supra notes 154-82 and accompanying text.
244. Exxon Shipping, 34 F.3d at 780; see also Sommer v. PMEC Assocs. & Co., No.
88 Civ. 2537(JFK), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20401, at *10 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
1993) (denying a motion to quash by the Department of Labor, a nonparty, under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) and disagreeing that an independent APA
suit was necessary). But see Drave Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., No. 95-MC-229-
CIV, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12625, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 18, 1995) ('Nothing in Rule
30(b)(6) abrogates the long-standing rule that governmental agencies may refuse to
allow the testimony of its employees in private litigation matters.").
245. Cases sidestepping this requirement rest on the shaky ground that an agency
head's order to a subordinate not to testify is involvement sufficient to provide juris-
diction and allow judicial review. See supra notes 120-47 and accompanying text.
Some courts have further restricted review to the D.C. federal district by denying
jurisdiction over agency heads located there. See Cates v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 480
F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1973); supra note 230.
246. See Lively, supra note 2, at 512 ("[Ulnless such review is readily available and
reasonably prompt, it may be meaningless.").
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First, to obtain judicial review, the requesting litigant must
bear the cost of a separate action against the agency official
who decided not to allow the testimony. Second, if the agen-
cy decision maker is in another district, circuit, or country,
the litigant must bring the collateral suit in a forum other
than that of the underlying action. Finally, most of the non-
disclosure regulations do not contain any standards for a
court to use in the collateral action when reviewing a denial
of testimony.24
Litigants entering the procedural maze that has developed
under the auspice of the Federal Housekeeping Statute may
require more than judicial intervention to find their way out
with their full discovery rights intact. The current system, in
which "[a] litigant who sought review of the agency's deci-
sion.., would face extra procedural complications and practical
problems of time, travel and money merely to reach the appro-
priate official,"248 requires the attention of Congress and legis-
lative reform.249 A proper legislative solution requires three
components: (1) the application of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure standard to federal agency decisions, (2) the
elimination of the need for a separate collateral action against
the agency, and (3) the Waiver of sovereign immunity in state
actions removed to federal court.
By spelling out the applicable standard of review, Congress
can remove the doubts that courts now entertain concerning any
agency housekeeping privilege. Agencies do not deserve any
special treatment in the area of discovery, and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure adequately protect any interests agencies may
have. Such a standard would force agencies to take account of
the litigant's need for the information and should cause them to
deny access only in cases of privilege or hardship. Litigants
would also be less likely to challenge an agency determination if
247. Kiesel, supra note 6, at 1658-59 (citations omitted).
248. Lively, supra note 2, at 500.
249. See id. at 514 ("Any uniform solution for reaching agency officials in a conve-
nient, timely and reasonably affordable manner may therefore require congressional
assistance."). Courts have been uncharacteristically lame in protecting what seem to
be historically judicial functions-the power to subpoena and control over relevant
evidence.
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agencies were to fully disclose the reasons for any denial."'
Removing the need for a collateral federal suit would elimi-
nate the procedural and monetary obstacles associated with
filing a separate action. It also would ensure prompt judicial
review of agency decisions. 5' Such legislative action would re-
quire a congressional grant of jurisdiction. 52 Under such a
statutory scheme, a federal court could not force a subordinate
to testify against the orders of the agency head, but the litigant
with a need for the evidence could challenge the agency's deci-
sion in the same forum.5 This would preserve the Housekeep-
ing Statute's original purpose of centralizing decisionmaking,
while providing substantive judicial review.
By waiving sovereign immunity, Congress could permit the
enforcement of the rights of private parties in state courts."
This action would give state courts concurrent jurisdiction to
review agency decisions and help generate comity."' Agencies
remain protected by § 1442, which allows them to remove the
proceeding to a federal forum if they desire;.. thus, they
should not bear any additional burden or expense.
250. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) (requiring parties to explain why a privilege ap-
plies). In addition to a congressional instruction to federal agencies to comply with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure standard, the courts should follow the Ninth
Circuit's lead and examine agency determinations accordiig to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Recognition of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure standard by
Congress would not be necessary for the implementation of a uniform standard, but
it would clarify the situation.
251. See Lively, supra note 2, at 514 ("Congressional action ensuring prompt and
proximate review of agency refusals to authorize employee testimony would be con-
sistent with the statutory mandate that housekeeping authority not be used to with-
hold information.").
252. See id.
253. Lively suggests that any extra burden to the agency would be resolved by
"having a regional or United States attorney present the agency's claim." Id.
254. The Ninth Circuit in Exxon Shipping believed that Congress had already
waived sovereign immunity for collateral federal suits under the APA's right of re-
view in 5 U.S.C. § 702. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. United States Dep't of Interior,
34 F.3d 774, 779 n.9 (9th Cir. 1994).
255. See Coleman, supra note 33, at 703-06 (presenting an argument for concurrent
jurisdiction in state courts).
256. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1994).
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CONCLUSION
The Housekeeping Statute, so simple and innocent in its lan-
guage, has created quite a conundrum. Federal agencies have
unfairly relied on the statute as having created a special
housekeeping privilege. No compelling reason justifies singling
out federal agencies and allowing them virtually unrestrained
discretion to avoid discovery requests for employee testimony.
The justifications advanced by agencies in support of this privi-
leged status are weak and not unique to the government. Fur-
thermore, the public's right to "every man's evidence" weighs
against agency rationalizations. The fact that federal agencies
have interests in limiting litigants' ability to force discovery
from them also makes agencies biased decisionmakers.25 The
courts, as neutral observers, are better equipped to balance the
competing parties' interests than are self-interested agency
heads.
Nationwide use of the Exxon Shipping-Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure standard of judicial review would create greater open-
ness of information and fulfill the judicial trend towards full
disclosure. 8 The Exxon Shipping standard would force agency
heads to analyze all subpoenas for employee testimony as they
would any other discovery request. The recognition by the Feder-
al Rules of Civil Procedure of common-law privileges and com-
peting interests adequately protects the government's legitimate
concerns, while ensuring that private litigants have access to all
relevant evidence.
Congress can ensure application of the Exxon Shipping stan-
dard by legislatively requiring agencies to follow the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure when reviewing requests for employee
testimony. Furthermore, legislative grants of federal court juris-
diction over agency heads' housekeeping decisions and waiver of
sovereign immunity would broaden litigants' ability to receive
257. See NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868, 876 (5th Cir. 1961) ("Responsibil-
ity for deciding the question of privilege properly lies in an impartial independent
judiciary-not in the party claiming the privilege and not in a party litigant.").
258. Several courts have sought a means to sidestep the Touhy doctrine in their
pursuit of the litigant's need for relevant evidence. See notes 120-47 and accompany-
ing text.
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important evidence timely and cheaply. These proposed legisla-
tive reforms would provide a procedurally just method of review-
ing agency determinations.
Courts should finally put the myth of a housekeeping privilege
to rest and should force federal agencies to abide by the same
standards applicable to all citizens.
Jason C. Grech
